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I. Introduction
On October 26, 2001, only six weeks after the
unfathomable horror of September 11, President Bush signed the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001
("PATRIOT Act").2 The bill was more than 340 pages long, had
significant changes in its final days, and affects more than fifteen
already existing statutes. 3 In response to the crisis of September
11, the legislation passed 98 to 1 in the Senate and 357 to 66 in the
House of Representatives without hearings and with little debate or
discussion. Yet, the debate is increasingly being heard above the
1 Associate Vice President for Legal Affairs, Office of the President, The
University of North Carolina.
2 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C., 50 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.). The Act
contains ten titles and addresses myriad issues, including: terrorism
investigation funding, immigration requirements, the enhancement of federal
authorities, assistance for terrorism victims, sharing of information among law
enforcement agencies, bioterrorism prevention, and enhanced surveillance
activities. Id.
3 The statutes include the Federal Wiretap Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (2000)
(Title III); the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-29 (2000); Exec. Order No. 12,333 (1982); the Cable Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 551 (2000); the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030; the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure (FED. R. CRIM. P.); and the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 49-495, 100 Stat.
1243 (18 U.S.C. §§ 111, 202), which contains the Stored Wire and Electronic
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11; and the Pen Register and Trap and
Trace Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27.
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din of crisis, with members of the higher education community
deeply involved;4 even members of Congress have questioned their
own actions voting tor the Act.' Essential to this growing debate is
the frank realization that the PATRIOT Act was implemented in
response to a national security crisis, rather than an unfolding
legislative action. Similar responses to actual or perceived security
crises resulted in The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, President
Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War, the
Espionage Act of 1917, the internment of Japanese-Americans
after Pearl Harbor, and the Smith and McCarren Acts, during the
McCarthy years.6 Historical perspective, however, reveals these to
4 The 2003 North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology Symposium, The
PA TRIOT Act, Consumer Privacy, and Cybercrime, exemplifies the role higher
education has in leading the intellectual examination of the PATRIOT Act.
While librarians have been most vocal about potential abuses of the PATRIOT
Act, other members of higher education have also fully engaged in the dialogue
on both sides. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA
PATRIOTAct: The Big Brother That Isn 't, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 607 (2002).
This Article argues that the common wisdom on the USA
Patriot Act is incorrect. The Patriot Act did not expand law
enforcement powers dramatically, as its critics have alleged.
In fact, the Patriot Act made mostly minor amendments to the
electronic surveillance laws. Many of the amendments merely
codified preexisting law. Some of the changes expanded law
enforcement powers, but others protected privacy and civil
liberties.... The Patriot Act is hardly perfect, but it is not the
Big Brother law many have portrayed it to be.
Id. at 608.
5 Representative C.L. "Butch" Otter, a Republican member of Congress from
Idaho, offered an amendment to the Commerce, Justice and State funding bill
that prohibits federal law enforcement agencies from implementing "sneak and
peek" search warrants. The bill passed by a vote of 309 to 118, with 113
Republicans voting in favor of it. In response to the growing criticism, Attorney
General John Ashcroft took his defense of the Act on the road. PBS, Online
NewsHour: Weighing the Patriot Act: Background (Aug. 19, 2003), at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/july-dec03/patriot_8-19.html (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
6 See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil
Liberties in Times of Security Crises, Address Before the Law School of Hebrew
University, Jerusalem, Israel (Dec. 22, 1987), at http://www.brennancenter.org/
resources/downloads/nation_security brennan.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); see also Johnathan R. Cole, The
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have been reactions, rather than responses, and none of these
reactions is defensible today; most must be viewed as
reprehensible and unjustified reactions to perceptions of the need
for expediency in the face of perceived threats to national security.
The core of the debate is one central to the fundamental
American struggle: freedom versus security and individual will
versus the public good.7 The tensions that are inherent in the
debate between surveillance needs and the preservation of civil
liberties have their roots in the fundamental struggle of community
interests versus individual interests-a struggle that has defined
much of the history of the United States, from the Declaration of
Independence through the Constitution, Bill of Rights, and the
statutes and judicial interpretations that have followed. Because of
the nature of the American tension between individual and
community interests, the provisions of the PATRIOT Act are
certain to be challenged, modified, and supported by more acts of
Congress, interpretations by the judiciary, and orders from the
executive branch. In fact, the Bush Administration and Congress
have already strengthened the surveillance powers of the
PATRIOT Act.8
It is certainly naive to reject surveillance as a necessary
national tool,9 and critics blamed the naivety in rules for
Patriot Act on Campus: Defending the University Post-9/11, 28 BOSTON
REVIEW 3T (2003).
7 See, e.g., SARAH VOWELL, PARTLY CLOUDY PATRIOT 33 (2003).
8 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 gives law enforcement
access to financial institution records by use of a "national security letter," rather
than a subpoena. See Kim Zetter, Bush Grabs New Power for FBI, WIRED
NEWS (Jan. 6, 2004), at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,61792,00.html
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) (citing
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-177, 117
Stat. 2599 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C., 50 U.S.C., 5
U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 8 U.S.C.)).
9 The surveillance and privacy debate is not new. Henry Stimson, known for
making one of the most memorable statements concerning the ethics of
surveillance, said,
After he entered the White House in 1933 ... [Franklin D.
Roosevelt] quickly resumed his interest in intelligence. Four
years before, Henry Stimson, the Secretary of State, had
abolished the "Black Chamber," the nation's first peacetime
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intelligence gathering as a reason for the devastating success of the
September 11 operation.' 0 However, the toll on civil liberties in
times of war and crisis has been high. As United States Supreme
Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. acknowledged:
When I think of the progress we have made over the last
thirty years, I look upon our system of civil liberties with
some satisfaction, and a certain pride. There is
considerably less to be proud about, and a good deal to be
embarrassed about, when one reflects on the shabby
treatment civil liberties have received in the United States
during times of war and perceived threats to its national
codebreaking agency, famously declaring, "gentlemen do not
read each other's mail." Later, in the shadow of Pearl Harbor,
critics would claim that this had neutered American
codebreaking during the 1930's. In reality, it merely
redirected it into more secret channels in order to conceal it
from an isolationist nation and Congress. The army set up its
Signals Intelligence Service under the codebreaking genius,
William Friedman, and by the mid-1930's it was regularly
cracking Japanese diplomatic ciphers. By the end of the
decade these were being discreetly circulated in Washington
under the codename "Magic."
DAVID STAFFORD, ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL, MEN OF SECRETS 7 (1999). It
is interesting that the FBI has recently developed its own "Magic Lantern,"
which is a computer Trojan horse surreptitiously delivered by e-mail, and
capable of recording every keystroke of a computer. Magic Lantern, which the
FBI admitted in December of 2001 is "under development," is not new
technology-it has been a hacking device for several years. See Robyn
Weisman, FBI Waves 'Magic Lantern', News Factor Network (Dec. 31, 2001),
at http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/story/15301.htm (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). It is a Trojan horse (similar to a
"virus") sent through e-mail, which captures every keystroke typed by a person,
after it installs itself on the target computer. By capturing the keystrokes,
passwords can be obtained and then encrypted documents can be opened with
the password. In addition, keystrokes can recreate all activities of the computer
user. While Magic Lantern's delivery is novel for law enforcement, key logging
is not. The FBI has installed key loggers in criminal investigations (pursuant to
a "sneak-and-peek" search). See, e.g., United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015
(D.N.J. 2001).
10 See, e.g., Stewart Baker, Wall Nuts: The Wall Between Intelligence And Law
Enforcement Is Killing Us, SLATE (Dec. 31, 2003), at http://slate.msn.com/id/
2093344 (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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security. For as adamant as my country has been about
civil liberties during peacetime, it has a long history of
failing to preserve civil liberties when it perceived its
national security threatened. This series of failures is
particularly frustrating in that it appears to result not from
informed and rational decisions that protecting civil
liberties would expose the United States to unacceptable
security risks, but rather from the episodic nature of our
security crises....
The sudden national fervor causes people to
exaggerate the security risks posed by allowing
individuals to exercise their civil liberties and to
become willing "temporarily" to sacrifice liberties
as part of the war effort."
It is this historical context and philosophical uneasiness that must
add fuel to the emerging debate surrounding the PATRIOT Act.
Title II of the PATRIOT Act was meant to be a solution to
one of the first questions everyone asked on September 11: How
could this have happened without the FBI and CIA knowing about
it? 12 However, Title II's solution, which broadens the powers of
law enforcement and national security agencies to conduct
surveillance, has had a significant impact on the use of surveillance
technologies and will arguably affect the privacy interests of
everyone, not just the "terrorists" who are the intended targets.
The message from the Department of Justice is that there is a need
for more tools in the fight against terrorism: "The Patriot Act
gives us the technological tools to anticipate, adapt, and outthink
our terrorist enemy. To abandon these tools would senselessly
imperil American lives and American liberty, and it would ignore
the lessons of September 11."13 But are we being asked to give up
" Brennan, supra note 6.
12 The focus of this article is primarily on Title II, which concerns surveillance
and privacy issues, and other Titles that particularly affect higher education.
13 PBS, supra note 5; see also Jerry Seper, Ashcroft says USA Patriot Act needed
to stop terrorists, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2003), at A03, available at
http://washingtontimes.com/national/20030819-110617-8552r.htm (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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essential liberty in the name of a little temporary security?'
14
Title II of the PATRIOT Act has received the most
attention because of the provisions concerning "roving wiretaps,"
"sneak-and-peek" warrants, Carnivore applications, lowered
standards for gaining surveillance authority, and other technical
issues. However, it's less obvious result is a fundamental removal
of the walls that once existed between the FBI and national
security agencies, and a removal of the internal wall in the FBI that
segregated intelligence gathering from criminal investigation. 15
"We are going to have to get used to a new way of
thinking," Assistant Attorney General Michael
Chertoff, who is in charge of [investigating] the
Sept. 11 attacks, said in an interview. "What we are
going to have is a Federal Bureau of Investigation
that combines intelligence with effective law
enforcement.
16
14 "Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania
Assembly: Reply to the Governor (Nov. 11, 1755), in 6 THE PAPERS OF
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 242 (Leonard W. Labaree ed.) (1963). This is especially a
concern if tools in the PATRIOT Act may reflect more a "wish list" for ordinary
criminal investigation, rather than specific and targeted anti-terrorism
techniques. See Peter Erlinder, Revelations of Pre-September 11 Warnings
Require PATRIOTACTRepeal, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, May 22, 2002, at
15 See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal Bureau of Investigation War on
Terrorism Counterterrorism, Intelligence and Analysis, at http://www.fbi.gov/
terrorinfo/counterrorism/analysis.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
The PATRIOT Act and a federal court decision in November
2002 have broken down what has been known as "the Wall"
that legally separated law enforcement and intelligence
functions. As a result, coordination and information sharing
between the law enforcement community and intelligence
agencies have been greatly improved. Since the attacks of
September 11, the cultural and operational wall between the
FBI and CIA has also been broken down, with the two
agencies becoming integrated at virtually every level of
operation.
Id.
16 Jim McGee, An Intelligence Giant in the Making, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2001,
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This new way of thinking is the abandonment of post-Watergate
policy decisions to separate intelligence and law enforcements
functions to prevent abuses by the FBI and national security
agencies.' 7 To many, this is the real concern with the PATRIOT
Act. Roving wiretaps, sneak-and-peek searches, and the host of
"tools" allowed by the Act are already in limited use, but the
rearrangement of law enforcement and national security agencies is
a return to an old way.
Colleges and universities must also get used to a new way
of thinking because they have an unmatched intersection of high
technology and foreign nationals-the explicit primary concerns of
the PATRIOT Act. Moreover, institutions of higher learning are
microcosms of the struggle between individual rights and the
public good, and are, by nature, forums for the most difficult
debates, with members of the higher education community often at
the forefront of the issues. The question is whether higher
education will be part of the response or part of the reaction.
This article first recognizes the tension between individual
at A04.
17 See RICHARD A. BEST, JR., INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT:
COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL THREATS TO THE U.S. 13 (footnote omitted)
(2001).
In some cases, efforts of intelligence agencies in support of
law enforcement efforts proved to be ill-advised. In particular,
instances of intelligence agencies acquiring information
concerning U.S. citizens or persons has been widely
condemned. In addition to various questionable Cold War
activities, such as mail openings and involvement with the
Mafia, the CIA and military intelligence units gathered
intelligence on antiwar groups within the United States during
the Vietnam War period.
Such activities served as a major impetus for wide-
ranging congressional investigations of the U.S. Intelligence
Community in the 94th Congress.
In the aftermath of sensational revelations about
improper activities by intelligence agencies, both the
Intelligence Community and its congressional overseers were
determined to separate the work of intelligence and law
enforcement agencies in order to prevent the use of
intelligence techniques against citizens and legal residents of
the United States unless court orders have been obtained.
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freedom versus the community good in surveillance activities, the
unjustified reactions taken in times of security crises, and Title II
of the PATRIOT Act's creation of a new way of thinking after
September 11. The article then examines the means and methods
of surveillance, and the significant changes made to existing
surveillance laws by Title II. The article also examines how
section 215 of Title II generated a debate between librarians and
the Justice Department that revealed the need for and importance
of that debate in determining whether the PATRIOT Act is a
reaction or a response to a perceived security crisis. The article
then examines provisions outside Title II, which have a significant
effect on institutions of higher education. The article concludes by
accepting higher education's duty to advance the debate between
individual freedom and the community good, and also higher
education's need to respond with practical solutions.
II. Methods of Surveillance and Information Gathering
For many concerned with the PATRIOT Act, the starting
point is the Fourth Amendment,' 8 and its first mandate that the
government cannot intrude when one has a reasonable expectation
of privacy; and its second mandate that permitted intrusions are to
be regulated and open.19 In response to the September 11 attacks,
18 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Id.
19 Although the PATRIOT Act concerns surveillance by the government, it must
also be understood that in this digital information age, expectations of privacy
on the Internet are, for the most part, unreasonable. While Sun Microsystems
CEO Scott McNealy's statement "You have zero privacy, anyway. Get over it,"
may be extreme, no institution of higher education acting as an Internet service
provider or other provider of communications can guarantee absolute privacy.
Any expectation of privacy on the Internet or local area network should be
replaced with a frank realization that privacy cannot be promised to any user of
Internet or network computer resources, because the technology leaves a clear
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the PATRIOT Act thrusts the Fourth Amendment back to the
forefront of the national consciousness. Title II fundamentally
changes the relationship of a communications provider to those it
serves and increases the power of law enforcement to perform
surveillance and to retrieve information. 20 These changes are seen
by many, on all sides of the political and civil liberties spectrum, as
significantly altering the privacy landscape in the United States of
America.2 1
and lasting trail of a user's activity. Internet use, network use, and e-mail are,
by their very nature, not private and there should never be any expectation of
privacy in their use. Information is shared, copied, stored, and disseminated
repeatedly and indiscriminately, all as a matter of transmission and delivery.
The overall lack of privacy does not, however, mean that any user of institution
resources should be subject to unreasonable interference from other users or
unreasonable access from either the institution or government entities. Thus, IT
policies should address the limitations of access and interference, and disclosure
protocols should protect unreasonable access and interference. In addition, users
should be aware that the institution adheres to all applicable laws that protect the
members of the institution community-including the PATRIOT Act.
20 For example, Title II of the Act:
* Allows an Internet Service Provider (ISP) to voluntarily disclose
content and other information from its users in situations it deems to be
an emergency;
" Permits intelligence and law enforcement to share previously protected
information;
* Increases the power of law enforcement to track suspects with "roving
wiretaps," which may be placed on any phone or other communications
device;
* Allows voice-mails to be seized with a warrant, rather than a wiretap
order;
* Enhances the ability and power to track suspects on the Internet;
* Allows an ISP to enlist the assistance of law enforcement to track and
resist hackers or other computer "trespassers";
* Broadens secret "sneak-and-peek" searches where law enforcement can
enter premises without notice;
* Lowers evidentiary standards for seeking information, making
surveillance and information retrieval easier; and
" Opens the door to allowing law enforcement to secretly install software
on individual computers or deliver surveillance software by Trojan
horse e-mails.
21 There are additional First Amendment concerns as well, such as whether the
PATRIOT Act will have a chilling effect on free speech and assembly.
A. Types of Communication
The methods of surveillance and information gathering
have paralleled the advance of technology, but the laws have not.
Many of the changes enacted by Title II of the PATRIOT Act are a
reply to those advances in technology and infrastructure, and the
inconsistencies in the ways different technologies were treated.
The methods themselves range from decades-old telephone wire
technology to, as yet, unconfirmed worldwide systems which
sweep and sort every byte of data from every source." The
surveillance laws specify three basic types of communication that
can be gathered: oral, wire, and electronic communications. Oral
communication is a human utterance made when the speaker
reasonably expects that the utterance will not be intercepted. It
does not include an electronic communication." Wire
communication is a human utterance transmitted in whole or in
part over wire, cable, or similar connection furnished by a
telecommunications facility; it did not include the portion of a
communication transmitted by a cordless telephone until 1994.24
Electronic communication means any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system.
25
B. Methods of Surveillance
There are three general methods of information gathering
that are at issue with Title II of the PATRIOT Act: wiretaps,
pen/trap devices, and Internet/computer gathering devices. A
wiretap is a device that intercepts the content of an oral, wire, or
electronic communication through the use of any mechanical,
electronic, or other device.26 "Content" means any information
22 See, e.g., Echelon Watch, http://www.echelonwatch.org/ (last visited Mar. 16,
2004) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
23 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2000).
24 1d. § 2510(1).
251 Id. § 2510(12).
26 Id. § 2510(4).
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concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that
27communication. A pen register is a device that is attached to a
telephone line and which records all telephone numbers dialed out
from a phone on that line.28 A trap and trace device is a device
attached to a telephone line, which records the number of each
telephone dialing into that line.29 They are treated identically in
federal surveillance laws.
The newest methods are those that gather information from
the Internet, and include Carnivore and DragonWare "taps." The
FBI describes Carnivore, now known by the less-threatening name
of DCS-1000, as a "surgical" ability to intercept and collect the
Internet communications that are the subject of the lawful order,
while ignoring those communications they are not authorized to
intercept. 30 Those who have analyzed the system state that DCS-
1000 is part of a suite of tools (known as DragonWare) including
Packeteer and Coolminer, which can combine to recreate Web
pages exactly as a surveillance subject saw them.31 DCS-1000,
alone, is a Windows-based system built with both commercial and
proprietary software, which "sniffs" packets of information
traveling on the Internet and then copies them. Because all
information on the Intemet travels in packets, some have
challenged the "surgical" ability of DCS- 1000.32 Magic Lantern
and Key Loggers are also new technologies to gather information
27 1d. § 2510(8).
28 Id. § 3127(3).
291d. § 3127(4).
30 Internet and Data Interception Capabilities Developed by FBI, Hearing
Regarding the Carnivore System Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
Subcomm. on the Constitution, 106th Cong. 67-305 (2000) (statement of Donald
M. Kerr, Assistant Director, Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation), at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress00/kerr072400.htm (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
31 Kevin Poulsen, Carnivore Details Emerge (Oct. 4, 2000), at
http://www.securityfocus.com/ news/97 (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of Law & Technology).
32 See Catherine M. Barrett, FBI Internet Surveillance: The Need for a Natural
Rights Application of the Fourth Amendment to Insure Internet Privacy, 8 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 16 (2002), at http://www.law.richmond.edu/jolt/v8i3/
article I 6.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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from the Internet. Magic Lantern, which the FBI admitted in
December of 2001 , is "under development," is not new
technology-it has been a hacking device for several years. 33 It is
a Trojan horse (similar to a "virus") sent through e-mail that
captures every keystroke typed by a person, after it installs itself on
the target computer. By capturing the keystrokes, passwords can
be obtained and then encrypted documents can be opened with the
password. In addition, keystrokes can recreate all activities of the
computer user. While Magic Lantern's delivery is novel for law
enforcement, key logging is not. The FBI has installed key loggers
in criminal investigations, pursuant to a "sneak-and-peek" search.34
C. Procedures for Requesting Access
The surveillance laws allow many different agencies to
collect information. The agencies include all of the Department of
Justice agencies (e.g., FBI), other federal law enforcement
agencies (e.g., Postal Inspectors, ATF), National Security agencies
(e.g., CIA), and state agencies. In addition, all states have their
own wiretapping and surveillance laws, as well as privacy laws.
The Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the
Department of Justice ("CCIPS") has issued a comprehensive
manual on searching and seizing computers and obtaining
electronic information.3 5 The CCIPS Appendix section contains
examples of typical orders, warrants, and requests.
Generally, there is a "hierarchy" of complexity in
requesting information, with the complexity increasing as the
information becomes more protected. The lowest is the simple
request, without any formal document, for information that is
public or readily available without an expectation of privacy, or is
33 Robyn Weisman, FBI Waves 'Magic Lantern'(Dec. 13, 2001), News Factor
Network, at http://crmdaily.com/story.xhtml?storyid= 15301 (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
34 United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015 (D.N.J. 2001).
35 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND
OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (2002), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/l&smanual2002.html (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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being provided with consent. A letter request is the next level. It
will specify the information being sought.36 A subpoena is the
next level and, although it is a court document, a federal official,
rather than a court issues it.37 A search warrant is more difficult
than a subpoena and must be issued from a court on the basis of
probable cause. It will be specific in its requirements and items
sought.38 A pen/trap order is more difficult to obtain and contains
very specific information. 39 A pen/trap order can be issued by
either a federal judge or a federal magistrate judge and must state:
(1) the person in whose name the telephone line to which the
device will be attached is listed, (2) the identity of the target of the
investigation, (3) the telephone number and physical location of
the telephone line to which the device will be attached, and (4) a
statement of the offense to which the telephone numbers likely to
be obtained relate.40 There is no provision to notify those whose
communications have been intercepted by a pen/trap. A pen/trap
order may be issued for any crime. 41 A wiretap order is the most
difficult to obtain.42 A wiretap order, which can be issued only by
a federal judge, must specify the following: (1) the identity of the
target, (2) the location of the wiretap, (3) the type of
communications to be intercepted and the particular offense to
which the communications relates, (4) the identity of the agency
authorized to intercept the communications and of the attorney
authorizing the application, and (5) the period of time during
which interception is permitted and whether the interception must
terminate when the communications sought are first obtained.43
The order also must state that the interception (1) shall be executed
36 See, e.g., id. at app. C.
37 See, e.g., id. at app. E.
38 See, e.g., id. at app. F.
39 See, e.g., id. at app. D.
40 18 U.S.C. § 3123(b) (2000).
41 Id. § 3122(2).
42 There are unique circumstances where a law enforcement officer, designated
by a high-ranking Justice official, may authorize a wiretap without an order. In
addition, there are many exceptions to the notice and the procedural provisions
from consent to exigent circumstances and an order is not always required to
collect information.
41 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4).
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as soon as practicable, (2) shall be conducted in such a way as to
minimize the interception of communications not within the scope
of the order, and (3) must terminate upon attainment of the
objective of the interception or in thirty days, whichever is
sooner.
44
III. Significant Changes to Existing Surveillance Laws
A. The Federal Wiretap Statute
The Federal Wiretap Act was enacted in 1968 and is often
referred to as "Title III. ''45 It generally requires a "probable cause"
wiretap order from a judge to intercept real-time contents of voice
and data communications. An affidavit from the government must
support the request for the order. A wiretap will only be allowed
for certain serious predicate crimes listed in the Act, and there is a
duty to minimize the interception of information that is not
relevant to the investigation. A wiretap order is more difficult to
obtain than a search warrant because interception of
communication has been held to be the most serious intrusion into
the right of privacy. A wiretap order for oral or wire
communications may be issued only for specific serious felonies.46
A wiretap order to intercept electronic communications may be
issued for any federal felony.47 Targets who have had their
communications intercepted must be notified of the interception no
later than ninety days after completion of the wiretaps.
Prior to the PATRIOT Act, the wiretap statute allowed an
ISP to monitor activity on its system to protect its rights and
property, but it was not clear under prior law that the ISP could
enlist the assistance of law enforcement when it discovered a
hacker ("computer trespasser"). Section 21748 of the PATRIOT
Act allows, but does not require, an ISP to enlist the assistance of
law enforcement and protects the government from liability if it
44 Id. § 2518(5).
41 Id. §§ 2510-20.
46Id. § 2516(1)(a)-(p).
47 Id. § 2516(3).
48 Entitled "Interception of Computer Trespasser Communication."
conducts warrantless wiretaps of computer trespassers. The
trespasser's activity need not relate only to terrorism. A "computer
trespasser" does not include a person "known by the owner or
operator ... to have an existing contractual relationship with the
owner or operator. 4 9 Thus, an ISP cannot use this statute against
one of its own users. Unfortunately, the section does not extend
explicit immunity to the ISP for authorizing or enlisting law
enforcement surveillance.
Section 20250 also amends Title 1,151 and allows a wiretap
order to intercept wire communications (involving the human
voice) for violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.52 This
amendment allows investigators to intercept online human voice
transmissions when investigating hacking offenses.
B. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
("ECPA") 53 regulates access to stored e-mail, other electronic
communications, and transactional records of subscribers and users
of a service. A warrant, issued on probable cause, is required for
newer e-mail, but transactional records may be obtained by use of
an administrative subpoena, which is much easier to obtain than a
warrant. Section 20954 reverses federal case law55 and the ECPA,
56
which required law enforcement to seize voicemail messages with
a wiretap order rather than a search warrant. This amendment
makes access to voicemail the same as for e-mail. Section 21057
49 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 § 217.
50 Entitled "Authority to Intercept Wire, Oral, and Electronic Communications
Relating to Computer Fraud and Abuse Offenses."
5118 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2000).
52Id. § 1030.
53 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986, Pub. L. No.
49-495, 100 Stat. 1243.
54 Entitled "Seizure of Voice-mail Messages Pursuant to Warrants."
55 United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998).
56 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2000).
57 Entitled "Scope of Subpoenas for Records of Electronic Communications."
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amends 18 U.S.C. § 2703 to allow investigators to use a subpoena
for a broader array of Internet service subscriber information. This
information now includes "the means or sources of payment for
such services," "records of session times and durations," and "any
temporarily assigned network address. 58 These provisions are
meant to make the ECPA technologically current and also to
provide the means to ascertain identities of individuals who use
anonymous or erroneous biographical data on Internet accounts.
The financial information is limited, however, to the bank account
number or credit card information used as a means to pay for the
communication service. A subpoena can also be used to gain e-
mails if they are older than six months and the government has
followed the required procedures.
Of considerable note is the new ability for law enforcement
to have nationwide service for search warrants. Section 22059
amends 18 U.S.C. § 270360 to allow a court, having jurisdiction
over an offense, to issue a search warrant for stored data (e-mail)
anywhere in the United States. Thus, a court in Virginia can issue
a search warrant for records of a Michigan resident that reside on a
California server.
Section 21261 amends 18 U.S.C. § 2702 and § 2703, and
allows Internet Service Providers to disclose information, with
greater freedom, in two significant ways. Prior law had no
provision for emergency disclosures, so if an ISP learned of a plan
by one of its subscribers to perform an act of terrorism, the ISP
could be civilly liable for disclosing that information. Section 212
resolves this by allowing, but not requiring, an ISP to disclose
content and other information when it "reasonably believes" that
there is an emergency that involves the immediate danger of "death
or serious physical injury to any person." 62 The section also allows
58 id.
59 Entitled "Nationwide Service of Search Warrants for Electronic Evidence."
60 Entitled "Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional
Records Access" - "Required Disclosure of Customer Communications or
Records."
61 Entitled "Emergency Disclosure of Electronic Communications to Protect Life
and Limb."
62 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
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the ISP to disclose content and non-content information for
purposes of self-protection. Under prior law, an ISP could disclose
content to protect its rights and property, but could not disclose
non-content, such as log-in records.
C. The Pen Register and Trap and Trace Statute
The Pen Register and Trap and Trace Statute6 3 was written
to regulate the interception of numbers dialed, received, or
otherwise transmitted on a telephone line to which the information-
gathering device is attached. However, the statute included only
telephone technology when it was drafted. The privacy intrusion
of this non-content information is considered to be lower than for
content or for a wiretap. Thus, the statute was written to require a
court to approve the request if law enforcement certified that the
information is relevant to an ongoing investigation. Because the
statute was originally written for telephones, section 21664 of the
PATRIOT Act amends the Pen Register and Trap and Trace
Statute to make the provisions apply to Internet communications.
Section 216 has the potential to be one of the broadest changes to
prior law, and may have the most long-term effect of Title II, given
the increasing importance of the Internet for communications. It
makes three significant changes to prior law. First, the
amendments to the ECPA clarify that the pen/trap statutes apply to
Internet and other computer network traffic, provided that the
devices do not include the contents of communications. The
information may be any non-content information, including all
"dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling technology." 65 The
section also allows for a device or an "intangible process" to be
"attached or applied to the target facility."66 This provides clear
115 Stat. 272 § 212.
63 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (2000).
6 Entitled "Modification of Authorities Relating to Use of Pen Registers and
Trap and Trace Devices."
65 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 § 216.
66 Id.
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authority to use software instead of just physical mechanisms.
Second, the section allows courts to issue orders that are valid
anywhere in the United States, not just their own jurisdiction. 67
This recognizes the deregulation of communications providers and
avoids the necessity to seek multiple supporting orders. Thus, an
ISP may be presented with an order from a court outside its own
state and which does not name the ISP specifically. Accordingly,
there are protections that recognize this potential for confusion.
The ISP has a right to receive "written or electronic certification"
from the law enforcement agency that the order applies to the ISP,
and 18 U.S.C. § 3124(d) is amended to provide that an ISP's
compliance with an order makes the ISP eligible for statutory
immunity. 69 Third, if the ISP is unable to gather the information
requested by its own capabilities and the FBI installs its DCS-1000
(Carnivore) or another device, it must then make a report to the
court concerning the installation, configuration, and information
collected.7 °
D. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
("FISA")7" allows the wiretapping, in the United States, of aliens
and U.S. citizens, in circumstances of "foreign intelligence" rather
than ordinary law enforcement.72 The purposes of foreign
intelligence collection are to deter, neutralize, or exploit espionage,
sabotage, terrorism, and related hostile intelligence activities.
73
There must be a finding of probable cause to believe that the target
of the wiretapping is a member of a foreign terrorist organization
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 id.
70 Id.
7 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-29 (2000).72See generally In re Sealed Case No. 02-001 (Foreign Intell. Surveill. Ct. Rev.
2002) (Nov. 18, 2002).
73 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 § 216.
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or an agent of a foreign power.74 If the target is a U.S. citizen or a
resident alien, there must also be probable cause that the person is
engaged in activities that may involve criminal violations. A
secret FISA federal court hears the applications for wiretap orders.
section 204 of the PATRIOT Act 75 explicitly excludes foreign
intelligence operations from the criminal procedure protections of
the ECPA, and reaffirms that FISA is the sole authority by which
foreign intelligence electronic surveillance and interception of
domestic wire and electronic communications may be conducted.76
One of the most controversial provisions of the PATRIOT
Act is section 206, 77 which amends 50 U.S.C. § 1805 and expands
the authority of FISA court orders to allow roving surveillance
similar to ECPA roving wiretaps. Now, all wire or electronic
communications relating to the investigation will be subject to the
order, regardless of the suspect's location. This section is an
attempt to thwart the use of disposable cell phones, changing e-
mail accounts, and the use of multiple phone locations. A roving
wiretap authority need not even name the individual or the entity
that is being required to assist. Given the broadness of such an
order, the PATRIOT Act provisions have several "good faith"
compliance immunity provisions. Among the protections are the
provisions in section 22578 that provide immunity for "any
information, facilities, or technical assistance in accordance with a
court order or request for emergency assistance" under FISA.79
FISA can also authorize pen/trap requests. PATRIOT Act
74 id.
7' Entitled "Clarification of Intelligence Exceptions from Limitation on
Interception and Disclosure of Wire, Oral, and Electronic Communications."
76 There are, however, additional rules for foreign intelligence surveillance.
Executive Order No. 12333 (1982) addresses the ability of intelligence agencies
to target U.S. citizens outside the United States, because there are no legislative
restrictions on wiretaps or other electronic surveillance performed outside the
United States. The order places limits on information gathered on U.S. citizens,
incidental to intelligence gathering.
77 Entitled "Roving Surveillance Authority Under The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978."
78 Entitled "Immunity for Compliance with FISA Wiretap."
79 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 § 206.
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section 21480 amends FISA at 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(3) and makes
the requirements for pen/trap the same as the requirements of the
ECPA. Thus, the requirement for obtaining a FISA pen/trap order
now is a certification that the information to be obtained would be
"relevant to an ongoing investigation.",8' This makes it easier to
obtain a pen/trap order under FISA. 82 The section does, however,
prohibit use of pen/trap in any investigation to protect against
international terrorism or surveillance where the person has been
singled out for investigation "solely on the basis of' First
Amendment activities.
83
Section 215 84 greatly expands the type of information that
may be subject to a FISA request for records and has created
considerable concern, especially for librarians whose ability to
80 Entitled "Pen Register and Trap and Trace Authority Under FISA."
81 Id.
82 See Center for Democracy and Technology, E-Commerce & Privacy Group,
Summary and Analysis of Key Sections of USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, at
http://www.cdt.org/security/01 1031 summary.shtml (Oct. 31, 2001) (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
Section 214: Pen register and trap and trace authority under
FISA. Bottom Line: Expansion of FISA pen register/trap and
trace authority in FISA that should lead to a significant
increase in such requests. Makes it easier for the government
to obtain a court order under FISA for pen register or trap and
trace surveillance. Eliminates the requirement in 50 U.S.C.
§ 1842(c)(3) that the government certify that it has reason to
believe that the surveillance is being conducted on a line or
device that is or was used in "communications with" someone
involved in international terrorism or intelligence activities
that may violate U.S. criminal law, or a foreign power or its
agent whose communication is believed to concern terrorism
or intelligence activities that violate U.S. law. Instead, Section
214 makes the FISA pen register/trap & trace requirements
more closely track ECPA's requirements for such surveillance
(i.e., providing a certification that the information obtained
would be relevant to an ongoing investigation).
Id.
83 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 § 206.
84 Entitled "Access to Records and Other Items Under The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act."
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protect patron privacy is seen to be eroded.85 50 U.S.C. § 1862
had limited FISA requests for business records to a narrow set of
items. 86 Section 215 eliminates the categories and allows orders
for business records to be issued to any person, including ISPs.
Librarians and university press associations became extremely
vocal about the effect on patron privacy, and section 215 has
become a central point of the debate on the PATRIOT Act.
87
85 American Library Association, Analysis of The USA Patriot Act Related to
Libraries, at http://www.ala.org/Content/NavigationMenu/OurAssociation/
Offices/IntellectualFreedom3/IntellectualFreedomIssues/TheUSAPatriot
Act in the Library.htm (Apr. 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
Section 215: Access to Records Under Foreign Intelligence
Security Act (FISA)
* Allows an FBI agent to obtain a search warrant for "any
tangible thing," which can include books, records, papers,
floppy disks, data tapes, and computers with hard drives;
* Permits the FBI to compel production of library
circulation records, Internet use records, and registration
information stored in any medium;
" Does not require the agent to demonstrate "probable
cause," the existence of specific facts to support the belief
that a crime has been committed or that the items sought
are evidence of a crime. Instead, the agent only needs to
claim that he believes that the records he wants may be
related to an ongoing investigation related to terrorism or
intelligence activities, a very low legal standard;
* Libraries or librarians served with a search warrant issued
under FISA rules may not disclose, under of penalty of
law, the existence of the warrant or the fact that records
were produced as a result of the warrant. A patron cannot
be told that his or her records were given to the FBI or
that he or she is the subject of an FBI investigation;
* Overrides state library confidentiality laws protecting
library records.
Id.
86 Center for Democracy, supra note 82. "Previously, section 501 of FISA (50
U.S.C. § 1862) had subjected only common carriers, public accommodation
facilities, physical storage facilities, or car rental facilities to FISA business
record authority." Id.
87 See Dahlia Lithwick & Julia Turner, A Guide to the Patriot Act, Part 1,
Should you be scared of the Patriot Act, SLATE (Sept. 8, 2003), at
http://slate.msn.com/id/2087984/ (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
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Attorney General John Ashcroft responded to the criticism by the
American Library Association ("ALA"), other library associations,
and civil rights protection groups by calling the concerns "baseless
hysteria., 88 ALA President Carla Hayden issued a response to the
Attorney General's remarks reaffirming the duty to protect patron
privacy. 89 Attorney General Ashcroft then responded by calling
Law & Technology).
Section 215 is one of the surprising lightning rods of the
Patriot Act, engendering more protest, lawsuits, and
congressional amendments than any other. In part this is
because this section authorizes the government to march into a
library and demand a list of everyone who's ever checked out
a copy of My Secret Garden but also because those librarians
are tough.
Id.
88 Attorney General John Ashcroft, Department of Justice, The Proven Tactics in
the Fight against Crime, Remarks at Meeting of National Astronaut Association
(Sept. 15, 2003), at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2003/
091503nationalrestaurant.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2004) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
Unfortunately, at this moment, Washington is involved in a
debate where hysteria threatens to obscure the most important
issues. If you were to listen to some in Washington, you
might believe the hysteria behind this claim: "Your local
library has been surrounded by the FBI." Agents are working
round-the-clock. Like the X-Files, they are dressed in
raincoats, dark suits, and sporting sunglasses. They stop
patrons and librarians and interrogate everyone like Joe
Friday. In a dull monotone they ask every person exiting the
library, "Why were you at the library? What were you
reading? Did you see anything suspicious?"
According to these breathless reports and baseless
hysteria, some have convinced the American Library
Association that under the bipartisan Patriot Act, the FBI is
not fighting terrorism. Instead, agents are checking how far
you have gotten on the latest Tom Clancy novel.
Id.
89 ALA President Carla Hayden, American Library Association, American
Library Association responds to Attorney General remarks on librarians and
USA PATRIOTAct (Sept. 16, 2003), at http://www.ala.org/
Template.cfm?Section=News&template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.
cfm&ContentlD=43916 (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
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Carla Hayden and offering his support declassifying the Justice
Department's report on use of section 215.90 ALA President
Haden also stated:
The ALA has been vocal on the issues of patron
confidentiality and the protection of privacy. The
library community stands ready to continue to
participate in this important public debate and to
seek the accountability and oversight necessary so
that we can both counter terrorism and preserve our
democracy's great strengths.
91
The Justice Department revealed that it had never used
section 215 to attempt to obtain library records. 92 Regardless of
We are deeply concerned that the Attorney General should be
so openly contemptuous of those who seek to defend our
Constitution. Rather than ask the nations' librarians and
Americans nationwide to "just trust him," Ashcroft could allay
concerns by releasing aggregate information about the number
of libraries visited using the expanded powers created by the
USA PATRIOT Act.
Id.
90 American Library Association, ALA President welcomes call, commitment
from U.S. Attorney General to declassify some PATRIOTAct reports (Sept. 17,
2003), at http://www.ala.org/Content/ContentGroups/PressReleases2/
PressReleases_2003_September/ALAPresidentwelcomescall, commitment
_from US AttorneyGeneral.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
Today, American Library Association (ALA) President Carla
Hayden welcomed a telephone call from U.S. Attorney
General John Ashcroft. In the call, the Attorney General
expressed his concern that people have misunderstood his
commitment to civil liberties and committed to declassify the
Justice Department report on Section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act.
Id.
92 See International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, at
http://www.iaclea.org/wmd/215AGmemo.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
Attached, for your information, is a memorandum from
Attorney General Ashcroft to FBI Director Mueller regarding
his decision to declassify the number of times Section 215
(business records provision--often referred to as the "library
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whether section 215 is essential to fight terrorism, or whether the
provision") has been used. That number is ZERO (0). This
provision has been the subject of a great deal of interest. A
relevant article is also included below.
Jamie Brown
Director and Advisor to the Attorney General
Office of Intergovernmental and Public Liaison
United States Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.; Room 1629
Washington, DC 20530
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR ROBERT S. MUELLER
FROM: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
SUBJECT: PATRIOT ACT SECTION 215
This memorandum confirms I have declassified the number of
times to date the Department of Justice, including the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), has utilized Section 215 of the
USA PATRIOT Act relating to the production of business
records. The number of times Section 215 has been used to
date is zero (0).
I know you share my concern that the public not be misled
regarding the manner in which the U.S. Department of Justice,
and the FBI in particular, have been utilizing the authorities
provided in the USA PATRIOT Act. Public confidence in law
enforcement is of paramount importance. That is why I have
taken this action despite the fact that it is generally not in the
interest of the United States to disclose information of this
nature.
While Congress has regularly been informed regarding the
number of times Section 215 has been used, and while
individual Members of Congress have been able to review that
information, to date we have not been able to counter the
troubling amount of public distortion and misinformation in
connection with Section 215. Consequently, I have
determined that it is in the public interest and the best interest
of law enforcement to declassify this information.
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PATRIOT Act was, for the most part, enactment of a "wish list ' 9 3
for law enforcement, it certainly exemplifies the value of open
public debate. The public debate also helped expose the use of
"National Security Letters" by the Justice Department.94
Because section 215 broadens the scope of information that
can be requested, section 215(e) creates immunity for good faith
disclosures of business records and does not waive any other
privilege. The authority cannot, however, be used for
investigations of "United States Persons" being investigated solely
on First Amendment activities.95 The section also requires the
Attorney General to report to Congressional committees on the use
of the new authority.
96
The duration of a FISA surveillance depends on many
factors, including the nature, type, and importance of the
information. Section 20797 increased the initial duration of FISA
surveillance to 120 days, and extensions can be requested.
Section 21898 has also created great concerns with civil
liberties watch groups. This section lowers the standard for FISA
surveillance. A certification need only be made that "a significant
purpose" rather than "the purpose" of surveillance or a search is to
obtain foreign intelligence information. Thus, FISA will be able to
collect criminal activity information as well as foreign intelligence.
93 See, e.g., ACLU, ACLU Calls White House Report on Internet Crime Law
Enforcement "Wish List" (Mar. 9, 2000), at http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/
Privacy.cfm?ID=7862&c= 130 (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law
& Technology).94 See Dan Eggen & Robert O'Harrow, Jr., U.S. Steps Up Secret Surveillance
FBI, Justice Dept. Increase Use of Wiretaps, Records Searches, WASH. POST,
Mar. 24, 2003, at AOI; see also VOWELL, supra note 7.
95 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 § 215.96 Id.
97 Entitled "Duration of FISA Surveillance of Non-United States Persons Who
Are Agents of a Foreign Power."
98 Entitled "Foreign Intelligence Information."
E. The Cable Act
The Cable Act99 contains protections for subscriber
information. It provides that a cable operator shall not disclose
personally identifiable information concerning any subscriber
without the prior written or electronic consent of the subscriber
concerned, and shall take such actions as are necessary to prevent
unauthorized access to such information by a person other than the
subscriber or cable operator. The Communications Act provisions
relating to cable are amended by section 211100 to have the ECPA,
the wiretap statute, and the trap and trace statue govern the release
of information relating to Internet and telephone services by cable
companies. When the Cable Act was adopted in 1984, cable
companies were not providing telephone and Internet services.
The Cable Act had very strict provisions regarding the release of
personal information so that requests for data about Internet or
phone customers required the cable provider to notify the customer
before complying with the request for information. This
amendment makes the release of relevant customer information
consistent with other sources. Note, however, that the release of
information concerning a customer's programming choices is still
governed under the Cable Act.
F. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure govern the
procedures in all criminal proceedings in federal courts. The rules
declare that they "are intended to provide for the just determination
of every criminal proceeding."' 0'1 By amending the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure (Rule 6) and 18 U.S.C. § 2517, the
PATRIOT Act section 203102 permits intelligence information
obtained in grand jury proceedings and from wiretaps to be shared
with any federal law enforcement, protective, intelligence,
immigration, and national defense individuals. Any intelligence
9 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
'00 Entitled "Clarification of Scope."
'01 FED. R. CRIM. P. 2.
102 Entitled "Authority to Share Criminal Investigative Information."
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sharing is limited, however, to use in connection with the agent's
official duties and subject to existing disclosure limitations. Grand
Jury information also must be provided to the court after
disclosure.
PATRIOT Act section 219103 has significantly changed the
law concerning search warrants. Under prior law, Rule 41 (a) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure required a search warrant
to be obtained in the district where the search was to be made, and
the only exception was if the property or person might leave the
district before the warrant was executed. Section 219 amends that
Rule and provides that, in domestic or international terrorism
cases, a search warrant may be issued from anywhere in the United
States in which activities related to terrorism have occurred.
Section 213104 broadens the potential use of "sneak-and-
peek" searches, i.e., surreptitious searches performed without
notice. 10 5 Section 213 amends 18 U.S.C. § 3103 and allows the
courts to delay the notice requirement to a "reasonable time" where
there is reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate
notice would have an "adverse result" or otherwise jeopardize an
investigation or delay a trial.106 The section is designed primarily
for searches rather than seizures. A warrant issued must prohibit
any seizure of tangible property or wire or stored electronic
communication, unless the court finds "reasonable necessity" for
the seizure.1
0 7
G. Additional Significant Title II Provisions
The PATRIOT Act specifies that there are no requirements
to make any changes in existing technology by adopting section
222.108 In 1994, Congress adopted the Communications
103 Entitled "Single-Jurisdiction Search Warrants for Terrorism."
104 Entitled "Authority for Delaying Notice of the Execution of a Warrant."
105 But see supra note 5.
106 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 § 203.
107 ild.
'08 Entitled "Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies."
204 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 5
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA" or "the digital
telephony law"). 0 9 CALEA was intended to preserve law
enforcement wiretapping capabilities by requiring telephone
companies to design their systems to ensure a certain basic level of
government access. Section 222 relieves the provider of wire or
electronic communication service of any additional requirements
to provide technical assistance (such as with CALEA), furnish
facilities, or require reconfigurations to allow surveillance. In
addition, the section provides for reasonable compensation to the
service provider for compliance with surveillance orders.
Section 223110 increases civil liability for unauthorized
disclosure of information gathered according to the PATRIOT Act
and provides administrative discipline for federal officers or
employees who engage in unauthorized disclosures.
Section 224" terminates the provisions of Title II on
December 31, 2005. However, the exceptions to the sunset
provisions are long and include many of the most controversial
sections." 1
2
109 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 (1994).
"t0 Entitled "Civil Liability for Certain Unauthorized Disclosures."
111 Entitled "Sunset."
112 The list of exceptions include:
* Section 203(a), which broadens authority to share grand jury
information;
" Section 203(c), which establishes procedures regarding sharing of
criminal investigative information;
* Section 205, employment of translators to support counterterrorism;
" Section 208, designation of FISA judges;
" Section 210, which broadens the scope of subpoenas for electronic
communications service providers to include the disclosure of the
means and source of payment;
* Section 211, which makes cable companies that provide Internet
services the same as other ISPs and telecommunications providers;
" Section 213, which broadens the authority to delay notification of
search warrants;
* Section 216, which extends trap and trace non-content to Internet
traffic;
* Section 219, which allows single-jurisdiction search warrants for
terrorism;
* Section 22 1, the trade sanction amendments; and
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IV. Foreign Student Monitoring
Section 416113 accelerates and expands the full
implementation of the foreign student visa-monitoring program of
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act.' 14 Full implementation was to be accomplished by January 1,
2003, and covers all nonimmigrant foreign students of all
nationalities in covered foreign exchange programs and will
include monitoring by any other approved educational institution.
The INS (now the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
("USCIS")) was directed to implement the Student Exchange
Information System ("SEVIS"), an electronic tracking system." 5
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act ("FERPA 116
does not apply to the information collected under SEVIS. 1
* Section 222, which eliminates the imposition of technical obligations
on a wire or electronic communication service provider.
113 Entitled "Foreign Student Monitoring."
114 8 U.S.C. § 1372(a) (2002).
115 The information to be collected will include:
" The current identity and address of the alien;
" The nonimmigration classification and the date the visa was issued or
classification changed or extended or the date the change in
classification was approved by the Attorney General;
* The current academic status, including whether the alien is maintaining
full-time status or satisfying the terms and conditions of the program;
* Any disciplinary action taken by the institution as a result of a
conviction for a crime, or change in participation as a result of the
conviction of a crime; and
* The date of entry and port of entry of the alien.
116 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; 34 C.F.R. § 99 (2003).
117 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 §§ 507 (entitled "Disclosure of Educational Records") and 508
(entitled "Disclosure of Information from NCES Surveys") amend the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act and the confidentiality requirements of
student databases to allow disclosure to the Attorney General or his designee, in
connection with the investigation or prosecution of terrorism crimes. The
PATRIOT Act provides immunity for good faith disclosure of records in
response to an order.
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V. Title VIII Expansion of Crimes and Penalties
The definitions of terrorism and terrorist acts have been
changed and new offenses have been added. 1 8 The new crimes of
harboring terrorists 119 and giving material support 120 have been
added. The crime of harboring a terrorist is a ten-year felony for
anyone who has "reason to know" that the person they are
harboring has committed or is about to commit a terrorist act. The
crime of giving material support is somewhat more problematic for
cclleges and universities. This new crime prohibits an
organization from giving anykind of assistance to an individual
who has been designated a "terrorist." There is no requirement
that the assistance be intentionally given. Higher education
generally gives the members of its community cash assistance,
lodging, access to communications, and access to research
equipment as a matter of course.
The PATRIOT Act has also created a new crime of
"domestic terrorism."1 21 Domestic terrorism is defined as "acts
that are dangerous to human life, which appear intended to
intimidate civilians or influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion or interfere with government operations
by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping."' 2 2 The
vagueness of this new definition has concerned many with its
potential application to acts of civil disobedience unrelated to
terrorism. 123
11' The PATRIOT Act also expands the ability to designate a group as a terrorist
group and expands terrorist crimes. Id. § 411.
119 Id. § 803 (entitled "Prohibition Against Harboring Terrorists").
120 Id. § 805 (entitled "Material Support for Terrorism").
121 Id. § 802 (entitled "Definition of Domestic Terrorism").
122 Id.
123 See ACLU, How The USA-Patriot Act Would Convert Dissent Into Broadly
Defined "Terrorism," Oct. 23, 2001, at http://archive.aclu.org/congress/
1102301d.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology);
Department of Justice, Dispelling the Myths Dispelling Some of the Major
Myths about the USA PATRIOT Act, at http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/subs/
u myths.htm (last visited on Mar. 29, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology); see also Kathleen McFadden, Ashcroft And
Wilson Linked In National Media, Articles Question Anti-Terrorism Charges
For "Common Crimes, " (Sept. 25, 2003), at http://www.mountaintimes.com/
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The expanded definition of the federal crime of terrorism
includes unauthorized computer access to sensitive government
information and dissemination of viruses. 124 Computer crimes are
also greatly expanded to enhance the government's authority to• 125
prosecute hacking, cracking, and denial of service attacks. 2 The
PATRIOT Act also clarifies and broadens the meaning of damage
or loss under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 126 and precludes
private lawsuits for negligent design and manufacture of software
and hardware. The PATRIOT Act also adds new defenses to civil
or criminal liability under the ECPA for service providers who
preserve stored data at the request of law enforcement officials.
27
Biological and chemical agents are also addressed in the
PATRIOT Act. Section 817128 expands the restrictions on the
possession and use of biological agents and toxins. Prior
biological weapons law prohibited the possession, development,
and acquisition of biological agents or toxins "for use as a
weapon."' 29 The PATRIOT Act amends the definition of "for use
as a weapon" to include situations where it can be proven that the
person had any purpose other than a proIhylactic, protective, bona
fide research, or other peaceful purpose. 30 The PATRIOT Act
mtweekly/2003/0925/ashcroftwilson.php3 (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology). The link between the two men-Watauga
County District Attorney Jerry Wilson and U.S. Attorney General John
Ashcroft-may not be immediately obvious aside from the fact that they're both
lawyers and both prosecutors, but the two have been mentioned in the same
news article at least twice before this one. A July 29 article in The Village
Voice and a September 15 Associated Press article datelined Philadelphia draw
parallels between the two men's use of anti-terrorism statutes to prosecute what
the AP story calls "people charged with common crimes."
124 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 § 808.
125 Id. § 814 (entitled "Deterrence and Prevention of Cyberterrorism").
126 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000).
127 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 § 815 (entitled "Additional Defenses to Civil Actions Relating to
Preserving Records in Response to Government Requests").
128 Entitled "Expansion of the Biological Weapons Statute."
129 18 U.S.C. § 175.
130 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
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also creates an additional offense of possessing a biological agent
or toxin of a type or in a quantity that, under the circumstances, is
not reasonably justified by a prophylactic, protective, bona fide
research, or other peaceful purpose.
13 1
The PATRIOT ACT creates a new crime that makes it an
offense for certain "Restricted Persons" to possess biological
agents or toxins listed as a "select agent" by the Secretary of
Health and Human services.' 32 These provisions have been
expanded and clarified in the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002.133
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 § 817.
131 id.
132 18 U.S.C. § 175b. Restricted persons include any individual who:
" Is under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding 1 year;
* Has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for
a term exceeding lyear;
" Is a fugitive from justice;
* Is an unlawful user of any controlled substance;
" Is an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
* Has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been
committed to any mental institution;
" Is an alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residency) who is a national of a country to which
the Secretary of State has made a determination has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism (currently
Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria); and
* Has been discharged from the Armed Services of the United
States under dishonorable conditions.
Id. The CDC and APHIS have produced a list of select agents and toxins, which
can be found on the CDC website at http://www.cdc.gov/ or on the APHIS
website at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of Law & Technology).
... Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002 (Bioterrorism Act), Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C.). The Bioterrorism
Act significantly changes the landscape of research regulation by requiring that
individuals involved with select agents be investigated. Prior to enactment of
the Bioterrorism Act, background checks were uncertain-with many
universities engaging in their own. The Bioterrorism Act now places the burden
of background checks on the Federal Government. The Bioterrorism Act also
SPRING 2004] USA PATRIOT ACT 209
VI. Conclusion: Responding to the USA PATRIOT Act
For institutions of higher education, the response to the
PATRIOT Act must reflect the concerns for both the individual
and the community good. On a theoretical level, members of the
higher education community must be encouraged to engage in the
debate on privacy versus surveillance. Institutions of higher
education are unmatched in forcing difficult and unpopular
opinions into the stream of social consciousness. 134 Moreover,
academic freedom is an apt tool to examine the PATRIOT Act; to
determine whether the Act is a reaction to a perceived security
crisis, a necessary set of tools to thwart terrorism, or something in
between. Regardless of where one stands on the surveillance
debate, it must be acknowledged that the "shabby treatment civil
liberties have received in the United States during times of war and
perceived threats to its national security' 35 is a very real legacy of
reaction, rather than response. It must equally be acknowledged
that the current Justice Department believes in the necessity for
"technological tools to anticipate, adapt, and outthink our terrorist
enemy." 13
6
On the practical side, higher education must respond as a
expands the reach of the PATRIOT Act's restricted persons prohibition to
include those who are reasonably suspected by any federal law enforcement
agency or intelligence agency of committing a crime of terrorism, knowing
involvement in terrorism or an organization of terrorism, or being an agent of a
foreign power.
134 Cf Hearing on Antiterrorism Policy before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2001) (statement of Attorney General John Ashcroft).
We need honest, reasoned debate; not fearmongering. To
those who pit Americans against immigrants, and citizens
against non-citizens; to those who scare peace-loving people
with phantoms of lost liberty; my message is this: Your
tactics only aid terrorists-for they erode our national unity
and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to
America's enemies, and pause to America's friends. They
encourage people of good will to remain silent in the face of
evil.
1d.
135 Brennan, supra note 6.
136 Baker, supra note 10.
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law-abiding citizen, with the knowledge that a very real threat has
presented itself and with the understanding that the threat must be
faced. Each institution must examine what privacy it is
"promising" its community members and must also decide what it
can actually deliver in light of the new demands for surveillance.
The establishment of protocols, procedures, and routines for
surveillance requests will benefit all involved and following a
general routine can prevent mistakes and unauthorized
disclosures; 137 many wiretap orders, warrants, and subpoenas have
specific provisions for not revealing the surveillance or
information production and now may not specify the exact
information to be disclosed. 138 For Information Technology ("IT")
administrators, it is essential to establish emergency and computer
trespasser procedures. The PATRIOT Act allows disclosure of
content and other material if there is an emergency situation. IT
administrators must make an informed decision how to respond on
this issue. Considering how this may relate to the new crime of
assisting a terrorist, situations cannot simply be ignored. Similarly,
hacking and cracking attempts should be reported so that a
decision can be made whether law enforcement will be involved in
computer trespasser activities.
The Justice Department, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, and National Security Agencies have been challenged to
perform an extraordinarily difficult task, one that puts the basic
struggle of individual freedoms and public good at issue. This
137 It is important to take students, clerks, and others out of the information
release process, to prevent disclosures or confidentiality breaches. Many court
orders, warrants, and subpoenas prohibit disclosure to the target or others. The
consequences of unauthorized disclosure could be disastrous. It is unfair to
expect confidentiality from those who were not hired to maintain it. Neither is it
fair to expect students or clerical employees to make decisions on whether or
how to release information.
138 Warrants, orders, subpoenas, and other requests are often written in "law-
enforcement-ese" and "legal-ese." Counsel can help translate the exact requests
and demands that are being made. This will help to prevent over-inclusion or
under-inclusion in the production of information. In addition, counsel can work
with the requesting agency and campus departments for an efficient and
restricted production or surveillance. Counsel can also coordinate the duties and
responsibilities imposed by other laws, policies, and procedures and help
maintain confidentiality and privacy rights.
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philosophical struggle has already erupted on campus, and the
causes of that philosophical struggle have become increasingly
concrete because the new realities of the fight against terrorism
have changed the way information is requested. Because
administration, faculty, students, and staff will not all agree on
what a reasonable expectation of privacy should be or the degree
with which to cooperate with requests for surveillance or
confidential information, higher education will be forced to make
fundamental choices as to how it will balance the interests in the
face of the new way of thinking, while being mindful of, and a key
participant in, the debate between individual and community
needs.
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